NESC Review of the 8-Foot High Temperature Tunnel (HTT) Oxygen Storage Pressure Vessel Inspection Requirements by Hoffman, Eric et al.
     
April 2009 
NASA/TM-2009-215316 
NESC-RP-05-113/05-034-E 
 
                                                                                                        
 
NESC Review of the 8-Foot High Temperature 
Tunnel (HTT) Oxygen Storage Pressure Vessel 
Inspection Requirements 
 
Michael Gilbert/NESC, Ivatury Raju/NESC, Robert Piascik/NESC, 
Kenneth Cameron/NESC, and Michael Kirsch/NESC 
Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 
Eric Hoffman 
Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 
Pappu Murthy 
Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio 
George Hopson/NESC 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama 
Owen Greulich and Wayne Frazier 
NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 
 
 
 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090015238 2019-08-30T06:38:39+00:00Z
 NASA STI Program . . . in Profile 
 
     Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to 
the advancement of aeronautics and space science. 
The NASA scientific and technical information (STI) 
program plays a key part in helping NASA maintain 
this important role. 
 
     The NASA STI program operates under the 
auspices of the Agency Chief Information Officer. It 
collects, organizes, provides for archiving, and 
disseminates NASA’s STI. The NASA STI program 
provides access to the NASA Aeronautics and Space 
Database and its public interface, the NASA Technical 
Report Server, thus providing one of the largest 
collections of aeronautical and space science STI in 
the world. Results are published in both non-NASA 
channels and by NASA in the NASA STI Report 
Series, which includes the following report types: 
 
• TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major significant phase 
of research that present the results of NASA 
programs and include extensive data or 
theoretical analysis. Includes compilations of 
significant scientific and technical data and 
information deemed to be of continuing 
reference value. NASA counterpart of peer-
reviewed formal professional papers, but having 
less stringent limitations on manuscript length 
and extent of graphic presentations. 
 
• TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM. Scientific 
and technical findings that are preliminary or of 
specialized interest, e.g., quick release reports, 
working papers, and bibliographies that contain 
minimal annotation. Does not contain extensive 
analysis. 
 
• CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 
technical findings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees. 
 
 
• CONFERENCE PUBLICATION. Collected 
papers from scientific and technical 
conferences, symposia, seminars, or other 
meetings sponsored or co-sponsored by NASA. 
 
• SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 
technical, or historical information from NASA 
programs, projects, and missions, often 
concerned with subjects having substantial 
public interest. 
 
• TECHNICAL TRANSLATION. English-
language translations of foreign scientific and 
technical material pertinent to NASA’s mission. 
 
     Specialized services also include creating custom 
thesauri, building customized databases, and 
organizing and publishing research results. 
 
     For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following: 
 
• Access the NASA STI program home page at 
http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
• E-mail your question via the Internet to 
help@sti.nasa.gov 
 
• Fax your question to the NASA STI Help Desk 
at 443-757-5803 
 
• Phone the NASA STI Help Desk at  
443-757-5802 
 
• Write to: 
           NASA STI Help Desk 
           NASA Center for AeroSpace Information 
           7115 Standard Drive 
           Hanover, MD 21076-1320
 National Aeronautics and  
Space Administration 
 
Langley Research Center   
Hampton, Virginia 23681-2199  
    
April 2009 
 
NASA/TM-2009-215316 
NESC-RP-05-113/05-034-E 
 
                                                                                                        
 
NESC Review of the 8-Foot High Temperature 
Tunnel (HTT) Oxygen Storage Pressure Vessel 
Inspection Requirements 
 
Michael Gilbert/NESC, Ivatury Raju/NESC, Robert Piascik/NESC, 
Kenneth Cameron/NESC, and Michael Kirsch/NESC 
Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 
Eric Hoffman 
Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia 
Pappu Murthy 
Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio 
George Hopson/NESC 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama 
Owen Greulich and Wayne Frazier 
NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 
 Available from: 
 
NASA Center for AeroSpace Information 
7115 Standard Drive 
Hanover, MD 21076-1320 
443-757-5802 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The use of trademarks or names of manufacturers in the report is for accurate reporting and does not 
constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or implied, of such products or manufacturers by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Consultation Report 
Document #: 
RP-05-113 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NESC Review of the 8-Foot High Temperature Tunnel 
(HTT) Oxygen Storage Pressure Vessel Inspection 
Requirements  
Page #: 
1 of 29 
 
NESC Request No. 05-034-E 
 
 
 
 
NESC Review of the 8-Foot High Temperature Tunnel (HTT) 
Oxygen Storage Pressure Vessel Inspection Requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 16, 2006 
 
 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Consultation Report 
Document #: 
RP-05-113 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NESC Review of the 8-Foot High Temperature Tunnel 
(HTT) Oxygen Storage Pressure Vessel Inspection 
Requirements  
Page #: 
2 of 29 
 
NESC Request No. 05-034-E 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Volume I: Technical Consultation Report 
1.0 Authorization and Notification ........................................................................................ 3 
2.0 Signature Page................................................................................................................... 4 
3.0 Team Members, Ex Officio Members, and Consultants ............................................... 5 
4.0 Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 6 
5.0 Consultation Plan.............................................................................................................. 8 
6.0 Description of the Problem, Proposed Solutions, and Risk Assessment ...................... 9 
6.1 Description of the Problem ..................................................................................... 9 
6.2 Proposed Solution ................................................................................................... 9 
6.3 Risk Assessment ................................................................................................... 10 
7.0 Data Analysis ................................................................................................................... 11 
8.0 Findings, Recommendations, and Observations .......................................................... 11 
8.1 Findings................................................................................................................. 11 
8.2 Recommendations................................................................................................. 13 
8.3 Observations ......................................................................................................... 13 
9.0 Lessons Learned.............................................................................................................. 14 
10.0 Definition of Terms ......................................................................................................... 14 
11.0 Minority Report (Dissenting Opinions) ........................................................................ 14 
Addendum.  Summary of Activities from September 8, 2005 to October 7, 2005 ................ 15 
 
Volume II: Appendices 
Appendix A.  ITA/I Request Form (NESC-PR-003-FM-01) ....................................................... 20 
Appendix B.  LOX Run Tank Sketch ........................................................................................... 23 
Appendix C.  LOX Run Tank Analyses ....................................................................................... 24 
Appendix D.  NESC Risk Assessment ......................................................................................... 27 
Appendix E.  List of Acronyms .................................................................................................... 28 
 
List of Figures 
 
4.0-1 Schematic Drawing of the 8-Foot HTT for Air Breathing Propulsion Testing .................. 6 
6.3-1 5 x 5 Risk Acceptance Matrix........................................................................................... 10 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
Technical Consultation Report 
Document #: 
RP-05-113 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
NESC Review of the 8-Foot High Temperature Tunnel 
(HTT) Oxygen Storage Pressure Vessel Inspection 
Requirements  
Page #: 
3 of 29 
 
NESC Request No. 05-034-E 
Volume I: Technical Consultation Report 
1.0 Authorization and Notification 
The request to conduct a consultation on the 8-Foot HTT Liquid Oxygen (LOX) Storage 
Pressure Vessels was submitted to the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) on June 6, 
2005. 
The initial evaluation of the request was presented to the NESC Review Board (NRB) and the 
consultation was approved on August 12, 2005.  The consultation review was held on September 
7-8, 2005, and a report documenting findings, recommendations, observations was written. 
On October 5, 2005, the consultation team reconvened to review additional information and 
results pertaining to the LOX Run Tank fatigue and fracture analysis results.  After reviewing the 
new information, the consultation team developed revised recommendations.  The revised 
recommendations, documented in the Addendum to this report, were approved by the NRB on 
October 6, 2005, and presented to the NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) Executive 
Council on October 7, 2005.   
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2.0 Signature Page 
 
Consultation Team Members 
Original signed on file 
 
 
Michael Gilbert, NESC Lead    Eric Hoffman, LaRC 
 
____________________________________  _________________________________ 
Ivatury Raju, NESC           Robert Piascik, NESC 
 
 
Kenneth Cameron, NESC    Michael Kirsch, NESC 
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Pappu Murthy, GRC           George Hopson, NESC 
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3.0 Team Members, Ex Officio Members, and Consultants 
 
Michael Gilbert, NESC   Chief Engineer, Team Lead 
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Wayne Frazier, HQ     Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) 
Owen Greulich, HQ     S&MA 
George Hopson, NESC Propulsion Discipline Engineer and Technical 
Warrant Holder 
Ivatury Raju, NESC  Structures Discipline Engineer and Technical 
Warrant Holder 
Robert Piascik, NESC Materials Discipline Engineer and Technical 
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Kenneth Cameron, NESC    Deputy for S&MA 
Michael Kirsch, NESC    Principal Engineer 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
The 8-Foot HTT (refer to Figure 4.0-1) is used to conduct tests of air-breathing hypersonic 
propulsion systems at Mach numbers 4, 5, and 7.  Methane, Air, and LOX are mixed and burned 
in a combustor to produce test gas stream containing 21 percent by volume oxygen.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.0-1.  Schematic Drawing of the 8-Foot HTT for Air Breathing Propulsion Testing 
 
The NESC was requested by the NASA LaRC Executive Safety Council to review the rationale 
for a proposed change to the recertification requirements, specifically the internal inspection 
requirements, of the 8-Foot HTT LOX Run Tank and LOX Storage Tank. The Run Tank is an 
8,000 gallon cryogenic tank used to provide LOX to the tunnel during operations, and is 
pressured during the tunnel run to 2,250 pounds per square inch gage (psig).  The Storage Tank 
is a 25,000 gallon cryogenic tank used to store LOX at slightly above atmospheric pressure as a 
supply source for the Run Tank.  Both tanks consist of an inner pressure vessel surrounded by an 
external shell, with space between the shells maintained under vacuum conditions. 
The proposed changes to the inspection requirements include: 
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– LOX Run Tank: from 10 years internal/external inspection to internal/external inspection 
after 1,000 pressure cycles. 
– LOX Storage Tank: from 10 years internal/external inspection to 10 year visual external 
inspection only. 
 
In reviewing the rationale for the proposed changes, the NESC Review Team determined that the 
fracture analysis was deficient and that the LOX Run Tank was not a “Leak-Before-Burst” 
(LBB) vessel.  The NESC Review Team recommended immediate stand-down of the 8-Foot 
HTT until either the analysis deficiencies were corrected or the tank was inspected.  The 
recommendation was accepted and the 8-Foot HTT stood-down operations on September 8, 
2005.  Efforts to correct the analysis deficiencies began immediately thereafter.   
 
The NESC Review Team also determined that there were no analyses supporting changes to the 
LOX Storage Tank requirements and recommended that such analyses be performed. 
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5.0 Consultation Plan 
 
The NESC assembled a team of technical experts, NESC Discipline Engineers, Discipline 
Technical Warrant Holders, and S&MA personnel, led by the LaRC’s NESC Chief Engineer.   
 
The team met on September 7-8, 2005, to conduct a review and accomplished the following:   
 
– Toured the facility. 
– Reviewed the materials, stress, fatigue, and fracture analyses results. 
– Interviewed the analysts that performed the analyses. 
– Reviewed the fabrication, service, and repair history of the tanks. 
– Interviewed Facility, S&MA, and Pressure Systems Managers. 
– Consulted with a Non-Destructive Evaluation expert. 
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6.0 Description of the Problem, Proposed Solutions, and Risk 
Assessment 
6.1 Description of the Problem 
Both the LOX Run Tank and LOX Storage Tank were due for internal inspection and 
recertification in calendar year 2000.  A review by the Pressure Systems Subcommittee of the 
NASA LaRC Executive Safety Council in late 2004 identified that the 8-Foot HTT LOX Storage 
and Run tanks had not been recertified.  Systemic issues related to the missed recertification are 
being addressed by the NASA LaRC. 
It was determined that continued operation of the facility beyond the recertification date was 
warranted based on the following conditions: 
 
LOX Run Tank (Refer to the sketch in Appendix B) 
 
• The tank was determined to be LBB by analysis. 
• Monitoring of the vacuum level between the inner pressure shell and the external shell would 
identify the presence of through-cracks in the pressure shell and allow the facility to stop 
operations before catastrophic failure would occur. 
 
Storage Tank 
 
• The tank operates at constant temperature and pressure, whereas crack growth is a function 
of temperature and pressure cycles. 
• The tank has an operational safety factor of 8 on ultimate material strength. 
• The allowable working pressure of the tank is 100 psia.  The tank nominally operates at 45 
psia. 
6.2 Proposed Solution 
The Pressure Systems Subcommittee recommended to the NASA LaRC Executive Safety 
Council, based on contracted analyses, that the recertification requirement for the 8-Foot HTT 
LOX tanks be changed as follows: 
1. Change LOX Storage Tank requirement to time-based visual external inspection techniques 
only. 
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2. Change LOX Run Time Tank to use 1,000 pressure cycles instead of 10 years in operation as 
basis for inspection. 
6.3 Risk Assessment 
There were no immediate safety risks at the time the review request was evaluated.  The analyses 
at that time indicated that sufficient margins existed to allow continued operations even though 
the tanks were at approximately 150 percent of the required inspection interval.  The risk 
assessment is shown in Figure 6.3-1.  Refer to Appendix D for a description of the NESC Risk 
Assessment likelihood and consequences. 
 
 
S – Safety NV – National Visibility MS – Mission Success 
Figure 6.3-1.  5 x 5 Risk Acceptance Matrix 
Safety 
• Probability: Very low probability of immediate failure, based on large analytical margins. 
• Consequence: Explosion and/or fire in proximity to inhabited buildings. 
 
National Visibility 
• Probability: Very low probability of immediate failure, based on large analytical margins. 
• Consequences: Publicity from failure to address Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit 
report. 
 
Mission Success 
• Probability: Very low probability of immediate failure, based on large analytical margins. 
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• Impact: Assumed hardware loss between $10M - $100M; no immediate impact to flight 
projects, might impact Exploration initiative. 
 
7.0 Data Analysis 
 
The NESC Review Team reviewed the stress, fatigue, and fracture analyses of the LOX Run 
Tank.  The individuals that performed these analyses were interviewed by the NESC Review 
Team to gain full understanding and to resolve any questions.  The results of the data analyses 
are documented in Section 8.1, Findings.   
 
Refer to Appendix C for key analyses figures reviewed by the team. 
 
8.0 Findings, Recommendations, and Observations  
8.1 Findings 
 
F-1. The damage tolerance analyses are insufficient to demonstrate LBB for the LOX Run 
Tank for the following reasons: 
 
– Critical crack size is predicted to be less than the tank wall thickness. 
– Fracture mechanics analyses did not account for weld material properties or 
residual stresses. 
– The structural finite element models do not capture changes in thickness, 
geometry, loading, and material properties. 
 
 The tank, as constructed, contains welded-in forgings for the upper access port and 
nozzles at both the top and bottom of the tank.  The properties of the weld material and 
the forgings differ from the properties of the material used for the tank walls, even though 
both the tank wall and forgings are 347 Stainless Steel.  The crack growth analysis 
assumed uniform material properties for all sections of the tank and did not include 
analyses of the welds.  In addition, material properties for 304 Stainless Steel were used 
in the analyses as being representative of 347 Stainless Steel because material properties 
for 347 Stainless Steel were not readily available. 
 
 Although a critical crack size less than the tank wall thickness was predicted, it was 
assumed that the crack would also grow perpendicular to the thickness until reaching an 
adjacent nozzle opening, which would act as a crack stop.  The crack would then be 
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stable (not growing) and be more than twice the wall thickness in length, thus satisfying 
LBB criteria.   
 
This assumption did not account for the weldments or the changes in material properties 
along the assumed path of the crack and, therefore, is invalid.  Also, the NASA standard 
for LBB is crack length 10 times the wall thickness, whereas the analysis was based on 
crack length 2 times the wall thickness.  Refer to Observation O-3. 
 
F-2. The fatigue analysis method used is inconsistent with the original fabrication inspection 
performed on the LOX Run Tank for the following reasons: 
 
– The fatigue analysis was performed according to the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section VIII, Division 2.  Application of this 
analysis is based on construction of the tank to ASME Section VIII, Division 2, 
which requires stringent manufacturing inspections.  These inspections set the 
initial crack size to be used in subsequent fatigue analyses based on the actual 
minimum detectable flaw size at the time the inspections were conducted. 
– The LOX Run Tank was actually constructed to ASME Section VIII, Division 1, 
with much less stringent quality assurance, inspection, and process controls. 
– The ASME Section VIII, Division 2, fatigue analysis was performed based on an 
assumed crack size rather than the minimum detectable size from the 
manufacturing inspection process. 
 
F-3. The LOX Run Tank fatigue life calculations do not currently account for pre-LaRC use.  
The tank was manufactured in 1959, but was first put into service at the HTT in 1989.  
Since 1989, the LOX Run Tank has been subject to about 600 pressure cycles.  The tank 
operational history prior to service at the HTT is not accounted for, nor has it been 
demonstrated that the tank was restored to "zero-time" status in 1989. 
 
F-4. All previous tank inspections have revealed cracks and/or crack-like indications that were 
repaired or removed.  The inspection history, shown below, suggests that cracks 
continually initiate or that the inspections may not have found all flaws. 
– 1965:  Cracks in 4-inch boss weld repaired 
– 1986: Four linear indications found and ground out 
– 1991: Six linear indications found and ground out 
 
F-5. No analysis or prior inspection data was available to establish a rationale to change the 
inspection requirements for the LOX Storage Tank. 
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F-6. The physical location of the LOX Run and Storage Tanks necessitated a waiver to 
requirements on proximity of LOX tanks to occupied buildings.  The waiver has as an 
acceptance rationale maintaining the tanks in a certified state. 
8.2 Recommendations 
R-1. Remove the LOX Run Tank from run-time pressure service until the LBB rationale is 
verified and the risk of continued operation is accepted, or until an inspection is 
performed and any detected flaws are properly dispositioned (F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4 and F-6). 
 
R-2. Develop analyses to support a rationale for changing the LOX Storage Tank inspection 
requirements (F-5). 
 
– The tank can continue in current operation while rationale is developed. 
– The Storage Tank must be determined to be LBB or fracture-critical to establish 
appropriate inspection intervals. 
8.3 Observations 
O-1. Inspection intervals should be determined by both cyclic-loading and maximum time, 
based on industry practices and standards.  Lengthening of inspection intervals should 
include as rationale prior inspection history and data. 
 
O-2. During the review, the team inquired about the Oxygen Hazards analysis for the HTT.  
Retrieval of records was not completed by the time the review team meeting ended. 
 
O-3. The “ten times the thickness” NASA standard is applicable to thin-walled pressure 
vessels and pipes.  For thick-walled pressure vessels (such as LOX Run Tank of 4.73 
inches in thickness), the NASA standards are not clearly defined and the Nuclear Industry 
Code for LBB conditions should be used.  The Nuclear Industry Code LBB conditions 
require the development of a through-the-thickness crack with sufficient crack opening 
for the fluid to leak and be detected. 
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9.0 Lessons Learned 
There were no lessons learned during this consultation. 
 
10.0 Definition of Terms 
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
Finding A conclusion based on facts established during the assessment/inspection 
by the investigating authority.  
Lessons Learned Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may 
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap 
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed 
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct; 
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision 
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a 
positive result.  
Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the 
assessment/inspection that did not contribute to the problem, but if left 
uncorrected has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or increase the 
severity should a mishap occur.  
Problem The subject of the technical assessment/inspection. 
Requirement An action developed by the assessment/inspection team to correct the 
cause or a deficiency identified during the investigation. The requirements 
will be used in the preparation of the corrective action plan.  
Root Cause Along a chain of events leading to a mishap or close call, the first causal 
action or failure to act that could have been controlled systemically either 
by policy/practice/procedure or individual adherence to 
policy/practice/procedure. 
11.0 Minority Report (Dissenting Opinions) 
There were no dissenting opinions during this consultation. 
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Addendum.  Summary of Activities from September 8, 2005 to 
October 7, 2005 
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Summary of Activities from September 8, 2005 to October 7, 2005 
 
On September 8, 2005, following a two-day review, the NESC 8-Foot High Temperature Tunnel 
(HTT) Oxygen Storage Pressure Vessel Inspection Requirements Technical Consultation team 
issued a safety recommendation to the Director, Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA), NASA 
Langley Research Center (LaRC), to immediately stand-down operations of the HTT until 
deficiencies in the fatigue and fracture analyses of the LOX Run Tank could be corrected.  This 
recommendation was based on the fact that deficiencies in the analyses negated the then current 
"Leak-Before-Burst" (LBB) result for the LOX Run Tank. "Leak-Before-Burst" was an essential 
part of the rationale for continuing to operate the tank 5 years beyond its specified inspection and 
certification date.  The Director, S&MA, LaRC, accepted this recommendation and ordered the 
immediate stand-down of HTT test operations.  The findings, recommendations, and 
observations developed by the NESC Technical Consultation Team from the review on 
September 7-8, 2005, are fully documented in the main body of this report. 
 
Subsequent to the HTT stand-down, an analysis team was formed by the NASA LaRC to update 
the fatigue and fracture analyses.  The NESC provided technical assistance to, and consulted 
with, the Center analysis team in critical areas of materials properties and fatigue and fracture 
analysis methods.  As a result of improved models, materials data, and revised analytical 
techniques, the Center analysis team determined: 
 
a. The LOX Run Tank is fracture-critical and not a LBB design. 
 
b. Conservative damage tolerance analyses showed large analytical margins (factor of 
10+) for a limited number (<100) of additional LOX Run Tank pressure cycles. 
 
On October 5, 2005, the NESC Technical Consultation Team reconvened via telecon to review 
the results [ref. 1] of the NASA LaRC HTT LOX Run Tank re-analysis efforts.  The NESC 
Technical Consultation Team concurred with the results (items a. and b. above) and developed a 
set of revised recommendations and additional observations (listed below).  This set of revised 
recommendations and additional observations were reviewed and approved by the NESC Review 
Board on October 6, 2005 and presented (in briefing format) to the NASA LaRC Executive 
Safety Council on October 7, 2005.  The NASA LaRC Executive Safety Council accepted the 
NESC recommendations as written. 
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Revised and Additional Recommendations 
 
R-1 (Revised). Based on conservative analysis assumptions and large analytical margins in the 
revised fatigue and fracture analyses, the NESC Technical Consultation Team’s 
position on the LOX Run Tank is: 
 
 Completion of the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) Ground Demonstration 
Engine test program is acceptable, based on an assumed test program of less 
than 100 additional pressure cycles of the LOX Run Tank. 
 
 The LOX Run Tank should be inspected and recertified immediately 
following the completion of the AFRL tests before any additional test 
programs are conducted. 
 
R-2 (Revised). Written and approved rationale for external inspection on the vacuum shell only 
of the LOX Storage Tank is required. 
 
R-3 (New). Stennis Space Center and other NASA facilities should be consulted and surveyed 
for high-pressure LOX tank inspection methods, techniques, and capabilities.  
 
Additional Observations 
 
O-4. Atmospheric pressure load modeling in the revised analysis needs to be updated; the 
overall effect is expected to be very minor (order of 14/2250 psi). 
 
 The atmospheric pressure acts on the external vacuum jacket shell and transfers to 
the LOX Run Tank pressure shell as point loads through standoffs, not as a 
uniform load on the pressure shell. 
 
O-5. Changes to the baseline inspection requirements may require changes to the NASA HQ-
approved site waiver for the tank locations. 
 
 "Waiver-of-the-waiver" approval requirements to conduct the AFRL tests, if any, 
needs to be determined. 
 
O-6. Vacuum monitoring of the LOX Run Tank as a safety precaution may lead to a false 
sense of security. 
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Appendix A.  ITA/I Request Form (NESC-PR-003-FM-01) 
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Appendix B.  LOX Run Tank Sketch 
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Appendix C.  LOX Run Tank Analyses 
 
 
LOX Run Tank Pressure Profile 
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LOX Run Tank Model 
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LOX Run Tank Top Stresses 
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Appendix D.  NESC Risk Assessment 
 
 Significant National 
Prestige and 
Visibility 
High National 
Prestige and Visibility 
Moderate National 
Prestige and Visibility 
Low National Prestige 
and Visibility 
National 
Significance 
Minimal or no 
identified National 
Prestige or 
Visibility  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
CONSEQUENCES
1 2 3 4 5
LEGEND
High – Accepted for 
NESC Board review.  
Probable NESC follow-
on IA. 
Medium – Accepted 
for NESC Board review. 
NESC or other NASA IA 
action required. 
Low – Not Boarded by 
NESC. Direct referral to 
other NASA IA org. 
Could result in death 
or perm. total disability 
/ Irreversible severe 
environ damage that 
violates law or 
regulation 
Could result in 
permanent partial 
disability, injuries or 
occupational illness / 
Reversible envinmt 
damage – violates law 
Could result in injury or 
occupational illness 
resulting in one or 
more lost work day / 
Mit. envirnmtl damage 
w/o law viol 
Could result in 
injury or illness not 
resulting in lost 
work day / Minimal 
envirnmtl damage 
Minimal/no safety or 
health plan 
violations / Minimal 
to no environ 
impacts 
Safety, 
Health, 
Environment 
4 5321Leve
What is the likelihood the situation or circumstance will 
. . . or –. . . Level 
5
4
3
2
1
Probability 
Very Likely Likely to occur often. Likelihood of occurrence is estimated to be greater than 0.10 (10-1) per 
operational opportunity 
High Expected to occur some time in the life of the item.  Likelihood of occurrence is estimated to be between 0.01 and 0.10 (10-2 
and 10-1) per operational opportunity 
Moderate Likely to occur some time in the life of the item.   Likelihood of occurrence is estimated to be between 0.01 and 0.001 
(10-2 and 10-3) per operational opportunity 
Low Unlikely but possible to occur.  Likelihood of occurrence is estimated to be between 0.001 and 0.000001 (10-3 and 10-
6) per operational opportunity 
Very Low Likelihood of occurrence is estimated to be less than .000001 (<10-6) per operational opportunity 
RISK 
DEFINITION 
RISK MANAGEMENT:  An organized, systematic decision-making process 
that efficiently identifies risks, assesses or analyzes risks, and effectively 
reduces or eliminates risks to achieving program goals. (NESC Risk 
Management Plan)  
NESC ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT APPLICATION (NARMA): The NESC 
database used to assess and prioritize concerns brought to the attention 
of the NESC.  URL: http://xx 
Risk:   Measure of the potential inability to achieve overall program objectives within defined constraints and has two 
components:  (1) the probability/likelihood of failing to achieve a particular outcome, and (2) the consequences/impacts 
of failing to achieve that outcome 
Consequence: Impact (typically categorized as negative) to program/project (loss, injury, disadvantage) 
Likelihood: Ordinal scale:  Relative ranking of probability of occurrence.  Numerical scale: estimated probability an event 
will occur combined with the uncertainty in the probability assessment 
What is the Consequence (Safety, Health, Environment, Mission Success, National Significance) of this NESC 
Safety, Health, Environment is defined as impact to life, health, working 
environment and natural environment 
Mission Success definition includes impacts to Major Mission 
Objectives (MMOs) as well as hardware loss 
National Significance is defined as the degree to which national 
prestige, visibility and public relations are impacted 
Safety, Health, Environment, Mission Success and National Significance 
can exist concurrently and are not mutually exclusive 
Risk scoring is accomplished by “multiplying” Likelihood (L) X 
Consequence (C ).  Note: numerical value is reflective of the ordered 
pair L, C.  Care must be taken when using multiplied falues as 
measures.  When determining risk consequence among Cost, 
Schedule, and Technical, the highest score is represented in the NESC 
Risk Matrix as a single score value.  
RISK CONSEQUENCE SCORING TERMS 
 
 NESC RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Rev A Annex. 
L
I
K
E
L
I
H
O
O
L
I
K
E
L
I
H
O
O
5
4
3
2
1
 NESC RISK 
1
2
3
4
5
 
C
O
N
S
E
Q
U
E
N
C
 Hardware loss between 
$100M and $250 Million 
/ Failure to meet > 50% 
MMO's 
 
Hardware loss 
exceeding $250 
Million / Failure to 
meet all Major Mission 
Objectives (MMO's) 
Hardware loss 
between $10M and 
$100 Million / Failure 
to meet any one 
MMO 
Hardware loss 
between $1M and $10 
Million / Failure to 
meet > 50% of 
supplemntl objectives 
Hardware loss 
between $200K 
and $1 Million / 
Failure to any one  
MMO 
Mission 
Success 
Example 
Lost work case per 
worker over a 20 
year private 
industry career 
Failures per US ELV 
Launch (1988 - 
2001) 
Place holder 
Fatal crashes per 
automobile trip 
Fatal crashes per 
passenger airplane 
departure 
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Appendix E.  List of Acronyms 
 
 
AFRL  Air Force Research Laboratory 
ASME  American Society of Mechanical Engineers  
GRC  Glenn Research Center 
HQ  Headquarters 
HTT  High Temperature Tunnel 
LaRC  Langley Research Center 
LBB  Leak-Before-Burst 
LOX  Liquid Oxygen  
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NESC   NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NRB  NESC Review Board 
OIG  Office of Inspector General 
psig  pounds per square inch gage 
S&MA Safety & Mission Assurance 
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